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Are FDA premarket trials on new drugs and medical devices excessive and do they inhibit consumer
access to new and much-needed technologies? Or may they actually be insufficient and expose
consumers to too much risk? To address this question, the new research described here compares the
regulatory approaches of the U.S. and the European Union for second and third generation coronary
stents. The research supports the FDA’s argument that reductions in their standards for device approval
would reduce consumer welfare. Nevertheless, the research also suggests that in some circumstances,
FDA reform proposals advocating for more relaxed premarket requirements but enhanced post-market
surveillance would yield considerable welfare gains.

Keywords
FDA, medical, device, regulation, consumer, access, risk, technologies, premarket, trials

Disciplines
Health Policy | Public Policy | Risk Analysis

License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License

This brief is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/7

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

The FDA and the Regulation
of Medical Device Innovation:
A Problem of Information,
Risk, and Access

ISSUE BRIEF
VOLUME 4
NUMBER 2
FEBRUARY 2016

Matthew Grennan, PhD, and Robert Town, PhD

Innovative new drugs and medical devices are often available in other countries
long before they arrive (or don’t) in the U.S., creating potentially frustrating
access problems for U.S. citizens who would like to utilize these products but
cannot due to the FDA’s approval process, which demands not only product
safety but effectiveness.
For this reason, among others, excitement in Washington, D.C. mounted in the summer of 2015, as representatives from across the political spectrum put forward
the 21st Century Cures Act. The Cures Act was a
major piece of rare bipartisan legislation that passed the
House of Representatives in July but has since stalled
in Congress. Touted as a law that would accelerate the
“discovery, development, and delivery of life saving and
life improving therapies,” the Cures Act offers policies
to improve research collaboration and access to funding, updates to the premarket clinical trials process, and
incentives to enhance personalized medicine and the
faster discovery of cures, especially for uncommon but
deadly diseases.1
The Cures Act—as well as other recently proposed
legislation2 and regular editorials in reputable news publications—focus attention on the often debated tradeoff
between consumer risk and access in the pharmaceutical
and medical device sectors. An assumption shared by
these proposals is that the current FDA approval process is somehow flawed. In this Issue Brief, we help to
answer the question: Are FDA premarket trials actually

SUMMARY
• This issue brief takes up the question of whether the current
FDA approval process is somehow flawed. Specifically, are FDA
premarket trials excessive and do they inhibit consumer access
to new and much-needed technologies? Or may they actually
be insufficient and expose consumers to too much risk?
• To address this question, the new research described here
compares the regulatory approaches of the U.S. and the European Union for second and third generation coronary stents.
• The research supports the FDA’s argument that reductions in
their standards for device approval would reduce consumer
welfare.
• Nevertheless, the research also suggests that in some circumstances, FDA reform proposals advocating for more relaxed
premarket requirements but enhanced post-market surveillance
would yield considerable welfare gains. But the gains from any
such policy change would critically depend on the rate and cost
of learning via post-market surveillance.
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excessive (i.e., limit consumer access to
an undue extent) or might they even
be insufficient (i.e., expose consumers
to unnecessary risk)? We also examine
some of the questions imbedded in
these reform proposals: Should different standards be applied to different
disease areas? What is the potential
for “post-market surveillance” to substitute for “pre-market” clinical trial
requirements?
We studied the market for a
widely utilized medical device,
coronary stents, and created a model
that captures the regulator’s tradeoff
between consumer risk exposure and
access to innovative products.3 Our
research sheds some much needed
light on the consumer welfare implications of current FDA regulations and
takes a useful step toward clearing up
some of the confusion prevalent in the
debate over the risk-access tradeoff.

MEDICAL DEVICE
REGULATION IN THE U.S.
AND THE EU
The term “medical device” applies
to a broad set of product categories,
ranging from crutches to pacemakers to CT scanners. Regulation of
medical devices in the U.S. began with
the passage of the Medical Device

process the manufacturer needs to
demonstrate that the device is ‘substantially equivalent’ to a predicate
device. Generally, bench testing data
and perhaps a very small clinical study
is all that is necessary for a device to
demonstrate equivalency. While there
is no standard timetable for 510(k)
clearance, a straightforward clearance can typically be obtained within
several months. Approval of a PMA
device, on the other hand, generally
requires the manufacturer to provide data from a pivotal study. These
are large, multi-center, randomized
clinical trials. These studies involve
hundreds to thousands of patients and
cost tens of millions of dollars to complete. In 2012, only 37 PMAs were
approved by the FDA.
In the EU the device approval
process for Class III devices is very
different from that in the U.S. Medical devices are regulated by three EU
Directives; chief among them is the
Medical Devices Directive which
passed in June 1993 and has been
adopted by each EU member state.4
A medical device is approved for
marketing in the EU once it receives
a ‘CE mark’ of conformity. The CE
mark system relies heavily on third
parties known as ‘notified bodies’ to
implement regulatory control over

Amendments Act of 1976, prior to
which there was little oversight of
the sector. This law placed oversight
authority within the Food and Drug
Administration and mandated that
the FDA use the dual standards of
“safe and effective” when evaluating
devices. The Act established a threetiered classification system for devices
(I, II and III), which are assigned
based on the perceived risks associated with using a product. Class III
devices are defined as those used for
supporting or sustaining human life
or are critical for preventing potentially unreasonable risk of illness or
injury. Class I and Class II devices
are lower risk devices. Our research
concentrates on coronary stents used
in angioplasties, which are themselves
a blockbuster device in terms of sales
and health impact. Stents are also
typical of implantable devices that are
deemed “necessary for the sustainment
of life” and thus they are regulated as
Class III devices in the U.S. and EU.
There are two basic regulatory
pathways within the FDA to bring
a device to market: Pre-Market
Approval (PMA) and the 510(k).
The PMA process applies to Class
III devices, while the 510(k) process
generally applies to Class II and some
Class I devices. Under the 510(k)

NOTES
House Energy & Commerce Committee, http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/21st-century-cures-act.
2 Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Mike Lee (R-UT) have a
proposal, entitled the RESULTs Act of 2015, that would even
more dramatically overhaul the system.
3 The main source for this Issue Brief is our paper “Regulating
Innovation with Uncertain Quality: Information, Risk, and Access in Medical Devices,” 2015.
4 The Medical Device Directive was passed at a time when
there was keen interest in a new approach to harmoniz1

ing regulatory frameworks across EU member states. In
contrast, the U.S. medical device regulatory framework was
established after the Dalkon Shield injured several thousand
women, garnering significant public outcry. At that time, a
non-governmental approach to device regulation was never
seriously considered by Congress.
5 In both the U.S. and EU, new-to-the-world devices may face
the additional hurdle of gaining reimbursement from healthcare insurance companies, but the devices we studied are
second and third generation products, so coverage determi-

2

nation has already been made prior to their introduction.
Boston Consulting Group, 2012, “Regulation and Access to
Innovative Medical Technologies.”
7 BCC Research, 2015, “Stents: Technologies and Global
Markets.”
8 The data used in this study consists of quantities and prices
at the product-hospital-month level, collected by Millennium
Research Group’s (MRG) MarketTrack survey of hospitals
across the U.S. and EU from 2004-2013. This survey—covering approximately 10 percent of total market activity—is
6
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CREATING AND EMPIRICALLY
ESTIMATING THE RISKACCESS TRADEOFF MODEL

trials than required by the FDA.5 For
this reason, medical device manufacturers (many of which are U.S.
based) typically introduce products
in the EU well before they seek FDA

devices. Notified bodies are independent, commercial organizations
that are designated, monitored and
audited by the relevant member states
via ‘competent authorities.’ Currently,

The standards that a regulatory body
like the FDA uses to approve products, as well as the information they
require from manufacturers, have
the potential to fundamentally alter
market outcomes. In order to determine the optimal regulatory testing
requirements for the FDA, we needed
to investigate a product with sufficient
utilization under multiple regulatory
regimes and one that also has experienced constant innovations over time.
Coronary stents—particularly second
and third generation stents—met this
need. Notably, EU and U.S. regulatory
approaches diverge most widely with
respect to Class III devices, including
stents, creating the variation we leverage in our research. The market for
coronary stents, which treat ischemic
heart disease (the leading cause of
global death accounting for 7 million
fatalities in 2010), is very large and
the market data for these products
is excellent. In 2013, total, worldwide sales of coronary stents exceeded
$7.9 billion, with the vast majority of
those sales occurring in the U.S. and
the EU.7

FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF EU/US TESTING AND MARKET INTRODUCTION. ALL
DEVICES ENTER THE EU AFTER SAFETY TRIALS. SOME DEVICES
THAT WISH TO ENTER THE US THEN RUN LONGER, LARGER EFFICACY
TRIALS (CONCURRENT WITH BEING USED IN THE EU MARKET).

US Testing
(-12 mo)

In US Market

EU Testing
(-6 mo)
Stents in EU Market

there are more than 70 active notified bodies within the EU. A firm
is free to choose any notified body
designated to cover the particular type
of device under review. To obtain a
CE mark, a Class III medical device
needs only to demonstrate safety and
performance, not necessarily effectiveness. Compliance with this standard
usually can be demonstrated with
much simpler and cheaper clinical

approval, if they decide to enter the
U.S. at all. Conditional on entry into
both the U.S. and the EU markets,
private reports have documented that
medical devices are introduced into
the U.S. on average approximately
four years after the EU (Figure 1).6

NOTES
the main source of detailed market intelligence in the medical device sector.
9 It is important to note that our model applies best to markets
like stents where interventional cardiologists are highly educated on new technologies. For innovations more broadly
used by generalists, there could still be substantial value
in the pre-market approval process, even with high-quality
post-market surveillance.
10 In 2009, over 640,000 stent procedures were performed in
the U.S. (Auerbach, 2012).

11

The amount of economic activity regulated by the FDA
and the Notified Bodies is significant. In the U.S., sales in
the medical device market exceeded $150B in 2010, or 6
percent of total national health expenditures, and approximately $130B (7.5 percent) in the EU (Donahoe and King,
2012; Medtech Europe, 2013). Further, the introduction of
new medical technologies are responsible for significant
reductions in mortality; and in so far as different regulatory
regimes affect the availability of these technologies, their
welfare impact extends beyond their direct impact on com-

3

12

merce.
Wall Street Journal, 2015, “FDA Inspectors Call Theranos
Blood Vial ‘Uncleared Medical Device’,” available at http://
www.wsj.com/articles/fda-inspectors-call-theranos-bloodvial-uncleared-medical-device-1445967607. Note that
blood tests are an area where excellent real-world data
on efficacy could often be generated by requiring small
amounts of redundant comparison tests.
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We acquired monthly data on product-level prices, quantities, and diagnostic procedures in the U.S. and EU.
These data were collected at the hospital level, which we then aggregated
to the geographic area. The data come
from Millennium Research Group, a
medical device market research firm.8
We then developed a model for capturing the regulator’s tradeoff between
consumer risk exposure and access to
innovation, the key feature of which is
that when a new innovation is discovered, its true quality is uncertain, and
the rate of learning about an innovation’s true quality in premarket clinical
trials can be greater than the rate of
learning after market entry.
Our data analysis documents
multiple patterns consistent with
the predictions of the model. The
predicted greater access in the EU is
evident in the fact that, on average,
49 percent of the stents used in the
EU are unavailable in the U.S. at the
points in time we studied. Meanwhile,
the predicted greater risk in the EU is
suggested by the facts that, on average,
products in the EU experience less
usage overall and higher volatility in
usage patterns when first introduced.
The U.S., by contrast, exhibits no
such patterns. The estimated model
also suggests that without any clinical
trials, the stent market could virtually
fail with very few patients selecting a
stent due to the risk of receiving a low
quality device.

WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF
REGULATORY POLICY
So how much testing is enough? In
our estimated model, we find that current FDA premarket testing for stents

falls within our confidence interval
(seven to nineteen months) for the
optimal regulatory policy conditional
on the rate of observational learning.
This result supports the FDA argument that reductions in their standards for device approval will reduce
consumer welfare. The EU, however,
despite being able to free-ride off of
the information being generated in
trials for U.S. entry, stands to benefit
by up to 20 percent in welfare gains
from increasing its premarket testing
standards (at least for stents).
Some FDA reform proposals
advocate for more relaxed premarket
requirements but enhanced post-market surveillance. In regards to medical
devices, the Cures Act would require
the FDA to establish a program
for priority review of breakthrough
products based on case studies instead
of clinical trials and it would provide
several regulatory process improvements, including a third party quality
assessment system through which the
FDA would accredit third parties to
assess device quality, safety and effectiveness. For the most part, the Cures
Act is addressing the correct issues,
especially with regard to devices with
small markets.
In the context of our model, we
find that if post-approval learning
rates approach those we observe from
clinical trials at a comparable cost, the
benefits from such a policy change
are substantial. In the extreme case
where post-approval learning is fully
informative and not too costly, the
optimal policy is to require no preapproval trials at all, which would
yield a welfare increase of 24 percent.9
The value of this increase is very large.
Using baseline estimates of utilization
4

and a value of $5,000 per treatment
yields an estimate of nearly one billion
dollars per year in increased welfare
from this increase in post-market
learning in the U.S. for stents alone.10
Our analysis of the impact of different
regulatory regimes not only speaks,
therefore, to the broad questions of
the economics of product quality
regulation, but also clearly informs
policy given these potentially large
welfare consequences.11
There is merit, then, to the argument that requiring shorter trials
with enhanced post-approval testing
could improve consumer welfare, but
the gains from this policy critically
depend on the rate and cost of learning via post-market surveillance. For
some products, observational learning
from real world use may make it difficult to infer product quality (i.e., not
having the randomization built into
treatment and the control available
in clinical trials). For other products,
though—and likely for those in our
sample—the problem is simply a lack
of systematic data collection and sharing of information.
An important caveat of our
analysis is that it holds the technology fixed and abstracts away from the
feedback effects of the FDA’s regulatory approval regime on firms’ incentives to invest in new products. In
other words, the analysis here cannot
be assumed to hold for future generations of stents. However, an important
takeaway from our analysis is that
the value of a technological innovation to the marketplace depends to a
large extent on the regulatory regime’s
informational requirements for product testing. For example, coronary
stents treat a narrower set of condi-
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tions than cancer drugs; but scaled
for market size, our findings suggest
that the role of regulating information/testing can be comparable to the
role of new technology innovation
in affecting welfare. Thus a broader
takeaway from our research is that the
innovation process should be considered holistically from idea to consumer—the value of innovation can
be significantly enhanced or diminished by the information regulators
require technology firms to produce
and disseminate.
Going forward, we plan to study
private incentives, or what market
forces are at play that would cause
medical device manufacturers to run
their own clinical trials and provide this information to the market
on their own, and not through the

requirements of the FDA. We also
want to explore asymmetric information, or what happens when a population less informed than, say, cardiologists must make decisions about
which medical products to use. A
longer term agenda would be to better
understand how these regulations on
the pathway from innovation to market approval affect the number and
type of innovations discovered in the
longer run. Such research would help
to expound upon our current findings
and have implications for everything
from coronary stents to Theranos
lab tests.12

CONCLUSION
The efficacy requirements of FDArequired clinical trials provide valu-

5

able information to the marketplace.
In some cases, better “post-market”
surveillance can decrease the need for
“pre-market” clinical testing, allowing
access to more innovative new products while still protecting consumers
from risk. The tradeoff between access
and risk in regulating the market
entry of new products is important in
a variety of industries. Our empirical
analysis is limited to coronary stents
between 2004-2013, and repeating it
is only feasible in the set of devices for
which detailed market data is available. While our theoretical model
provides guidance on how to consider
extrapolating to policy in other cases,
doing so should be done with care.
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